CAVC–Hillyard v. Shinseki- CUE it again, Sam

Even though this decision goes against the Vet, one can hardly fault the Court or the VASEC for their logic. Joseph C. Hillyard, a peacetime Veteran, suffered a head injury that caused him some mental problems. He filed claims for this injury when he was discharged in August of 84. The VA turned him down. He appealed it all properly, but Vets must remember, prior to the enactment of of the 1988 VJRA and the inception of the new Court, there was no higher venue for appeal than the BVA. 


      He filed to collaterally attack this claim in 2001 and lost again. However, he did not appeal it to the CAVC. His rationale was logical, but there really was no clearly erroneous error to correct.

    Dissatisfied with those results, he enlisted a man many consider to be an accomplished legal beagle in the VA world. That would be Kenneth M. Carpenter of Topeka, Kansas fame. Mr. Carpenter is no stranger to the Court and knows the ins and outs of adjudication there. As to why he agreed to accept this arcane CUE attack and defend it, we may never know. Altruism? Properly informed, he would probably shy away from it. The CUE laws have always been very strictly interpreted and there is virtually no fudge room. Granting CUE to decisions is rare. Very few attacks are successful. This is not to say that it is impossible, but it must be a glaring error. And more importantly, there is one abiding precept. You only get one bite at the apple. 

     Mr. Hillyard’s theory of apple biting was more nuanced. He believed that if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again was the tried and true adage. That is what inspired his new attack, albeit on a new theory. If the Court had allowed this, VA would be up to their ass in CUE claims that went on forever. Veterans filing new claims would have to stand in line to make room for the perennial  “frequent filers”. The claims process would become so bogged down with these do overs that meaningful litigation would take years.

     Mr. Carpenter should have seen this one coming. It certainly shouldn’t have come as any surprise. This decision was just posted on the Court’s website as of this morning. We may have not seen the end of this. He still has 30 days to file his appeal with the Federal Circuit and see if he can make it stick there. Somehow we doubt it unless it’s being filed in the 9th Circuit. I’m sure Vets everywhere remember the cutting edge jurisprudence handed down by them in their review of the Stolen Valor Act. 

     Meet the unsinkable Mr. Hillyard and his sidekick, KC from Topeka:

     We pray no moral, upstanding Vets who obtain advice here would try to gum up the judicial works with litigation such as this. It is a disservice to Vets to tie up the courts at their expense. Obtaining justice is sometimes a life and death, time is of the essence pursuit. We won’t dwell on this other than to say it has a distinctive odor about it we here at HCVets find repugnant.

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CAVC–Heino v. Shinseki–April Fool’s Day at the Court?

April Fool’s day at the Court?

     Before Hagel, Moorman and Schoelen, a certain appellant named William H. Heino, Sr. pleaded an extraordinary case pro se. It was decided April 11th, 2011, just ten days after my favorite day of the year. It might have been more appropriate to issue it on the first as it is the most bizarre I have read in years. Not for what the august judges decided, but for the sheer madness that was decided by a panel of judges rather than a single judge.

     When a novel situation arises in VA law and a Vet appeals up to the Court, a panel is convened. But a run of the mill decision is usually handled by a single judge. Judges are busy people. They have to listen a lot, read a lot and occasionally dictate a long, reasoned decision for their secretary to type up. They are so busy handing out justice to Veterans that only very important law changing justice demands a panel decision.

     Mr. Heino contends he has to cough up $7.00 every month to get his high blood pressure medication. To add insult to injury, they only manufacture the tablets in 25 mg. dosage and Mr. Heino’s prescribed dose is 12.5 mg./day. This necessitates Mr. Heino take one of those pill cutter doomoflotchies and whack all his tablets in half. Mr. Heino contends he should get a break on his $7.00 a month co-pay because he has to cut the pills in half. He further argues that he should perhaps get 30 25 mg. tablets a month if they insist on charging this exorbitant amount for 15 tablets. Finally Mr. Heino argues that the $7.00 copay exceeds the actual cost of the prescription and is therefore against the law. Not that this has any bearing on the subject, but Mr. Heino is not service-connected for anything. He merely uses the VA as his pharmacy, and, for all we know, his medical plan. He is entitled to do that. He is also entitled to clog up the Court’s busy schedule to appeal for justice.

     Justice in the VA system is slow but inexorable. There are many cases that require extensive development and time consuming legal research to make sure justice is dispensed correctly. With some of these decisions, time is of the essence for medical or financial reasons. Therefore I find it difficult to believe the Court would accord a decision of this minor magnitude a 60-piece orchestra and a top slot on the New York Times Bestseller list. It will consume two sizable pulp trees for publishing the decision and the reams of copies that were preliminary drafts.  Mr. Heino will be directed to pay any withheld monies to the VA for past prescriptions. The VA Police at his VAMC will be issued a picture of Mr. Heino as a potential “probable mental deficiency”/ agitator.  All this for about $42.00 a year?  Hello? McFly? What is going on?

     I searched but there is simply no intelligent life in this thing. Judge Hagel went so far as to actually file a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Please sir. May I have more pulp for paper? 

http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Heino-09-112-published-opinion-April-11.pdf 

     17 pages of decision. Did you know that Gilbert v. Derwinski (1990) which was positively earthshaking for Veterans jurisprudence, took only 19 and addressed multiple, seminal issues that will affect Veterans for many years to come, if not forever? We here believe this is a collective judicial attempt at tardy humor around April Fools day. We certainly needed something to raise our spirits and this is a good beginning.

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COVA–Bentley–The First CUE Case

We have discussed CUE (Clear and Unmistakable Error) many times but few Vets know how and why it exists. It is another one of those blessings bestowed on us by a grateful nation for our service. Just as we are accorded the benefit of the doubt, so too are we allowed to disturb an otherwise settled case of law and reopen it for perceived error. This avenue is not available in a civil court.

     Journey back to 1990 and see how the modern concept of CUE evolved. It started long before this in 1928 when the old VA first incorporated the idea. It was further enshrined in 1946 after the war when the more modern Board of Veterans Appeals system emerged. And there it sat until the Court of Veterans Appeals was inaugurated in 1989 by the VJRA.

     The first case in the new CUE batter’s lineup was Mr. Russell L. Bentley on July 26th, 1990. Oddly, Mr. Bentley’s Christian name repeated itself almost 3 years later when the Court started chipping away at this sacred right in Russell v. Derwinski.

       Mr. Bentley filed a long series of motions over a 40 year period with VA over his service connected injuries. VA shortchanged him in 1960 and he knew it. Fortunately for him, this finally came to a head after the new COVA was ensconced, thus allowing him a hearing before them. It was the very first CUE claim and therefore, as a panel decision, it set precedence.  The reason for the appeal was clear cut and straight forward. Most aren’t this simple and require cogent, tortured reasoning. Mr. Bentley had been handed a 40% rating and his illness deserved 60%.  The BVA said as much. Hell, even the Secretary admitted it, but somehow the Director of Compensations in D.C. got hold of it and screwed it up.

     Hard on the heels of this came a trickle which turned into what surely felt like a potential flood to the Court.  Mr. John W. Akins’ appeal was heard by the Court a month later on August 27th.  Prior to his decision being  decided, Mr. Bentley’s was on September 13th. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a decision consistent with their findings.

     On April 23rd, 1991, the Court filed Mr. Akins’ decision and again reversed and remanded for readjudication consistent with their findings. Well, ladies and gentlemen, Vets were starting to sit up and take notice of this newfangled CUE thing and started sharpening their pencils and lubricating their typewriters. The concept of opening up an old 1946 decision and winning it in 1991 sounded pretty lucrative. Other Vets were reviewing their pending appeals and now started searching in vain for possible CUE.

     On April Fools day of 1991, Mr. John G. Oppenheimer’s CUE claim came before the Court for its hearing. His decision was handed down on July 15th and remanded for more development by the Board.

     Thompson, Akles and others were starting to crop up with similar reasons for review. Some had merit, some didn’t. As the filings amassed in the mail room, the Court decided it had to act and act fast. The proper vehicle arrived in the form of Mr. Robert B. Russell and Mrs. Rosie Sampson Collins. I guess the Court was still rather chauvinistic then because in spite of her being a lady and alphabetically before Mr. Russell, she still got second billing on the Header. I have attached that decision below as well for anyone who wishes to see the evolutionary aspect of the Veterans legal system.

     The Secretary, in an attempt to stem the tide of CUE filings, tried something novel and implied the Court had no business reviewing BVA decisions for CUE.  That went over like a lead balloon up at Indiana Ave. NW. Mr. Derwinski was kept after school and put on detention, but he did take away a strategic win here. The Court reasoned semantically that if there was a clear and unmistakable error, there can be no benefit of the doubt. Either there is an error or there isn’t.  

      More importantly, the Court held that if there was an error, and it wouldn’t have changed the outcome such that it yielded a win for the Vet, then it, too, wasn’t CUE. The phrase the Court chose was if the error didn’t manifestly change the outcome, then it wasn’t clear and unmistakable. This is where the concept of an outcome based decision arose. Henceforth, a simple procedural or statutory error that would not have granted the claim was no longer CUE.  The heretofore two pronged pitchfork of CUE had just sprouted a new tine with Russell.  Things have pretty much remained the same since, but Caffrey v. Brown (1994) did whittle another branch off the tree. Vets had often relied on incorrect or missing info in their claims file to win CUE. Caffrey held that an incomplete record was not an incorrect record.

     The law has not retreated appreciably since then, but it does seem to shrink imperceptibly every time it arrives at the CAVC.

      Join with me now as we climb into the DeLorean and visit 1990:   Please click on Bentley below to open the PDF file and energize the hyperdrive motivator.

Attached is Bentley as well as Russell.

Bentley_89-70

Russell_90-396

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CAVC–Frederick v. Shinseki 2011– Don’t mess with Ruth

Allow me to introduce you to one Ruth Hill Frederick. She is not the lady you would want to attempt to assault. Snatching her purse might be akin to overcoming the Gordian knot with no sword. I wouldn’t doubt she packs a ,25 calibre belly gun, perhaps a FN “Baby”.

Mr. Hill punched out on May 28th, 1970. That date resonates with me as this FNG had just arrived in country thirteen days earlier. Mrs. Hill, Ruth, if you will, applied for DIC and was promptly granted it. In December, 1986, shortly after she turned 57, she remarried. Being an honest person like you and me, she timely reported this to the VARO. They discontinued her DIC at that point as that was how the law was written back then. So far so good. No harm, no foul.

The next seminal date was December 16th, 2003. Congress decided to change the law to allow a surviving spouse to continue to collect DIC even in the event of remarriage as long as he/she did it after age 57.  I say he/she as I’m sure there must be the odd man or two who married a WASP or WAC. It was further promulgated that spouses who desired to obtain this DIC (who had married after age 57) had one year from the above date to register for it. That gave an end date of December 16th, 2004. Before we venture any further, I want the reader to understand something. Receipt of DIC is predicated on the spouse having a permanent and total rating (i.e. 100%). Therefore the number of eligible spouses seeking DIC was finite in number, probably on the order of less than 20,000 by 2003. Conversely, by 2010 the number was probably less than 8,000. DIC pays about $1200/mo. or so currently.

Ruth, being a sharp woman of keen intellect, heard about this change in the law and filed for it in November, 2007.  I’m going to go out on a limb here and bet she also clipped Tuesday coupons for weekly specials at the local Safeway. At this point, I guess the gentle reader has already figured out that Secretary Grinch couldn’t leave well enough alone and had to steal her Christmas. His odds would have been better trying to take down a Brinks warehouse with $9 million inside and two drunken guards.

The Board, at his direction, turned her down on the request by reasoning that she hadn’t filed for this “in the window” before 12/16/04. But the Board made its decision on shaky ground-on the part of the law that was not codified.  They had not parsed the statute to perceive its true implications. You see, Ruth wasn’t applying for the DIC. She was asking to be reinstated as she had already technically “applied “for it in 1970 and been granted it.  Fearless Leader Erik the 1st disagreed and refused to budge. He read the regulations, cast the chicken bones and brought in the tea leaf readers. As he signed their paycheck, they all concurred that there was only one way to read the statute.  They also reasoned that an uneducated dolt like Ruth couldn’t fathom these highfalutin’ laws and tried to blow smoke up her ass. Say this like a sheep: “Baaaaa-aaaad idea.” Ruth probably went out right about then and purchased the services of a nice young lawyer named Paul M. Shoenhard using all that money she had saved up clipping coupons. They filed a NOA and scampered on up to the Court for a date with the General in November of ought 10.

I think of the Beatles song about now: Now Erik it seems, had been smoking his greens, and proceeded to fabricate bull$hit.  Verily so. The Secretary stuck to his guns much like  Slick Willy when they brought out Monica’s blue dress with that pesky stain on the front.. He must have known at some point he was doomed. The statute was never intended to disenfranchise spouses who had qualified prior to its enactment, nor did it go to lengths to do so. Imagine the pit bull who has latched onto a teddy bear and has no intention of letting go. That’s how tenacious this debate became:

“The Secretary suggests that the universe of persons affected by this Public Law provision includes only those who previously applied for benefits.  He further reasons that if the universe of persons affected by this portion of the Public Law is only those who previously applied for DIC, then all such persons would have met the end date for submission of an application, rendering any such interpretation of the uncodified provision of the Public Law meaningless.  The Secretary’s universe of persons, however, is ill defined.  Specifically, it ignores the fact that there likely are surviving spouses who remarried after the age of 57 and prior to enactment of the Public Law who never applied for DIC prior to enactment of the Public Law.  Under the plain wording of the statute –which sets an end date for application –  these individuals clearly would have to submit an application no later than December 15, 2004, or forever lose their benefits.  Thus, the plain language interpretation is not rendered meaningless and is not absurd, as the Secretary suggests.” Frederick v. Shinseki (2011)

Without digging too deeply, it might be safe to assume the VASEC was a charter member of the Flat Earth Society. Mensa membership, however, is going to forever elude the Erikmeister, I’m afraid.

What is sad and oddly missing from all this is one simple test. Read the statute. Examine the meaning of it. Examine the congressional intent in enacting this and who stood to benefit. Using 8th grade logic skills, one can see Congress was trying to sweeten life for old ladies whose husbands (or the obverse I mentioned above) had been injured in war. This is whatLincoln set out to do and the boys in Foggy Bottom were simply continuing in the same vein.

The Secretary, on the other hand, is trying his damnedest to reduce the number of eligible spouses. Had he succeeded, he might have saved the VA several hundred thousands of dollars until the Ruths of  America succumbed to old age and disease. Hell, it might not have even amounted to that much. Veterans of the big WW2 andKorea are the only beneficiaries and they are falling like flies unless the Secretary hadn’t noticed. Of all the hills to choose to die on, the General seems doomed to follow in the footsteps of Brevet Major General (Colonel) George Armstrong Custer .  The General Counsel the Secretary has at the Board (027) is either woefully uneducated or is having a communications snafu with him.  Third year legal students with any acumen whatsoever should be able to ferret out the thrust of this statute. The only other possibility is that the Secretary does not serve Veterans’ best interests. How can that be?  I can almost hear Tim Allen doing his trademark “Aeugh?”

I’ll let you be the judge on this one. Is the enemy of my enemy my friend? Not if he’s a former General, apparently. I apologize for that. It was uncalled for. I am inured to believing VA justice is imperfect justice unless or until it arrives at the Court. JOVO

http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Frederick_09-433_published_opinion_March_11_2011.pdf

P.S. Apparently, the Secretary is unhappy with the response of the Court as I just spotted this being heard at oral argument on March 9th, 2012. Bozo Boy  isn’t finished with Ruth yet, which is sad.

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CAVC–George v. Shinseki (2011) SJD–Telling Fibs at the Big House

This is an illuminating case for several different reasons.  Veterans with HCV have been availing themselves of our limited resources now for three years and we have never illustrated what happens when you get caught stretching the truth up at the “Big House”. This is a wonderful example even though it is a single judge ruling. Gentle Veterans with real morals would not need to search this decision for useable info anyway. 

     Neatly summarized here is the case of one Robert J. George versus his nemesis, Gen. Shinseki.  Old Bob, here, is attempting to pull the wool over Judge Lawrence B. Hagel’s eyes. Don’t ever try this at the CAVC and most especially, don’t even try it on any judge with the name LAW in his first name. 

     Bob filed for six items in April of 06, among them Hepatitis. He didn’t submit much more than the Risk Factors Questionnaire. Yep. No nexus or any other supporting records. Just that dogged male determination we are so well acquainted with-Onward through the mental Fog! Full speed ahead! VA denied that November and he filed his NOD. Subsequently, in March of 07, he was sent a letter setting up a C&P exam. He claims he never got his 2007 notice from the VA to report.  Nevertheless, he didn’t complain of this in his NOD. When the SOC was issued stating the same thing, he still never murmured any disagreement with their assessment of the posture of the denial. In fact, he never even raised the subject in his Form 9. The BVA made short work of this and put a fork in it. He dutifully filed his NOA and marched on up to D.C.

 

   0 hour was 9 A.M. Thursday, February 24th. Judge Hagel properly deduced that if old Bob had never received that scheduling letter and missed his Dog and Pony show, he sure would have pissed blood to prove it before he ever got up to the Court. He had ample opportunity at the AOJ and again at the Board. He politely let Bob off the hook on whether he was lying about it or not. An impolitic judge might not have, but the President always appoints judges with more than just strong credentials. Fortunately for Bob, this saved him a lot of face. Now he can blame his law dog, Jeany C. Mark, Esquire, for the inconvenient, incongruous facts. Such is life.

 

     At any rate, here’s what happens when you “disremember”:

 GeorgeRJ_09-3294

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COVA– Littke v. Derwinski (1990)–Original Duty to Assist

In our continuing series on Oldies But Goldies, we were researching where a completely new concept of VA law originated on evidence and remembered this gem.

Mr. Harold E. Littke, although the decision doesn’t mention it, was probably a Veteran of the War to End All Wars.At 57 years of age, he put in a claim for IU due to a lot of aches and pains. He was already rated at 20%, but hadn’t worked for 5 years. At his D&P (that would be the Dog and Pony show)exam before the VA, he was miraculously pronounced good to go for employment that didn’t entail sitting or standing for long periods of time. Yes. That’s pretty much what they said.

The veteran also informed the BVA that his recent X-rays taken revealed marked deterioration in his condition and that he had requested an examination by the VA.

In affirming the rating board’s decision, the BVA found that although the veteran’s disabilities did limit his occupational opportunities, they did not preclude him from engaging in ordinary work which did not entail extensive physical exertion. The veteran now appeals to this Court, seeking a reversal of the BVA’s decision. Under 38 U.S.C. § 4052 (1988), this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. (Littke v. Derwinski )

Now, for the newcomers to VA law, this is the scenario. For as long as time can be remembered up until 1988, the BVA was THE final arbiter of the law. The VJRA Act of 1988 created an Article 1 court to hear Veterans appeals from the BVA and allow them to be reviewed by the Federal Circuit. The VA and the BVA did not take kindly to this trespass on what had traditionally been their turf. They blithely continued to make the same errors and the Court of Veterans Appeals (COVA) began their new job cleaning house and rearranging the legal furniture. Mr. Littke had the pleasure of being one of the first new guests the Court entertained.

The Court discovered numerous errors regarding the proper collection of evidence and instances where the BVA ignored the Veteran and never sought highly probative documents which supported his contentions for IU. His D&P show was a complete failure and violated several important tenets of VA medical evidence collection. The Court expressed their displeasure at the cavalier attitude the BVA accorded Mr. Littke and the poor legal reasoning behind their flawed decision. They were sent packing and told in no uncertain terms to try again- correctly this time.

We can assume Mr. Littke was granted that for which he asked because one does not see his name arise in the legal calender   anywhere after this:

Here I might add that we are starting to see this same attitude surface anew. It’s an ugly development and doesn’t bode well for Vetkind. The VASEC must always remember he represents the Vets first, not his government. Apparently he has dyslexia or misread the Mission Statement issued byLincoln: “To care for him who shall have borne the battle, his widow and his orphan child.”

Littke is attached here:

Littke_89-68

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CAVC–Clemons v. Shinseki (2009)–Not an M.D.

VetCourtAppealsPromoClemons v. Shinseki is a marvelous piece of work. I’m sure Eric the clueless wasn’t entirely enthralled with the outcome, but that is neither here nor there. Bill Clemons simply reinforces Espiritu v. Derwinski from our point of reference.

Mr. William N. Clemons was a Squid and a participant in the Korean “Misunderstanding”. He served aboard the USS Rochester from 2/52 to 9/ 53.  They stored some cadaver popsicles in the ice box on board and this had a deleterious effect on poor Mr. Clemons’ brainbox.  In 2002, nearly two score and ten years later, he filed for PTSD reasoning that that was probably what he suffered from. He didn’t much care what the name of it was. He knew he had a problem and asked VA for help with it. Utilizing their four dimensional Ouija Board techniques, the VA fiddled with it for 4 years and finally came to the conclusion it was not PTSD. Silly Billy had filed for PTSD and they had determined he had a schizoid personality disorder. Because he had not claimed this, he was not entitled to it. VA’s theory was simple. “Start over with a new claim, Bill”. Mr. Clemons wasn’t going to be rolled that easily. He dutifully filed his NOA and set about remodeling the kitchen patiently for three years.

2000px-Rubik's_cube.svgIt should never have had to have been appealed that high and when it arrived, the Justices started examining it like a Rubik cube. The General immediately went into full pit bull mode and said Mr. Clemons didn’t deserve to be there as he didn’t suffer the claim he was appealing (PTSD), and the illness he did have hadn’t even been decided yet ( schizoid personality). Therefore, absent a claim to appeal, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear it.

Mr. Clemons, on the other hand, patiently explained there was, and had been, only one claim. It certainly wasn’t his fault that he wasn’t a licensed headshrinker capable of diagnosing his problem. He had come to VA, hat in hand, and intimated that his head wasn’t too tightly attached anymore. In spite of his thoughts on the subject, he was putting himself in VA’s able hands and letting them figure it out.

The Court had to decide first whether they had the right to hear it. If there were two separate claims, then it was Goodbye Mr. Clemons.  Displaying remarkable insight, the Judges rightfully reasoned that Mr. Clemons had one claim and one only. Perhaps it was multifaceted, but it was still basically one claim.

About this time the General had a pow wow with his people. They realized the futility in continuing to blow smoke up the Justices’ asses. He then approached Mr. Clemons and allowed as how they probably might oughta ask the Court to issue a Joint Motion for Remand (JMR). The VA would call this a reasonable accommodation on their part. Mr. Clemons wanted a rapid resolution to this, smelled victory and agreed wholeheartedly.  Unfortunately for the General and Mr. Clemons, the Justices now had a death grip on this doggy bone and were loathe to relinquish it.

After much examination, they decided to clarify the claim for the General on the off   chance he still didn’t get it. Instead of a simple JMR, they explained that what Mr. Clemons had was unarguably one claim only, not several inextricably intertwined ones. As such, the VA was instructed to send it all the way back down to the RO and basically start over with a new adjudication based on the premise that the mental trauma Mr. Clemons experienced in 1953 was either an anxiety order or a schizoid personality disorder. He had been diagnosed with both by VA’s finest and they had made the added mistake of saying that it was directly related to the popsicles on board the USS Rochester.

In 1993 Espiritu v. Derwinski was decided. It held that a Veteran, absent any formal medical training, was not capable of making decisions medical in nature. This was certainly a valid holding and no one found fault with it. Layno v. Brown (1995) expanded on this by saying a Vet was capable of testifying as to those symptoms he could ascertain via his five senses. Decisions following this were similar and expanded only the circumstances but not the underlying jurisprudence.

When Mr. Clemons entered the arena, the General granted him medical authority to determine his disease and then held him accountable for his own misdiagnosis. In the General’s mind, VA had accepted Mr. Clemons’  explanation for his ills at face value. They could hardly be held to account for this unexpected turn of events. And being the stand up guys they were, well shoot, they were more than willing to start a new claim for these other, recently discovered disorders. Of course, there would be no discussion of an effective date earlier than 2009.

The Clemons Court was not entirely finished with the General, however. They reasoned that just as a Veteran is ill-equipped to make decisions medical in nature, the blade cuts both ways so that a lay claimant cannot be held to a narrowly claimed diagnosis – one he is incompetent to render when determining what his actual claim may be in the first place. This is Layno and Espiritu 180 degrees out of phase.

I’m sure the General wasn’t expecting this.  He thought he had arrived with an airtight case. When faced with Pandora-like reality, he tried desperately to retreat with a JMR.  What ensued were seven additional pages of decision that created more favorable jurisprudence for Veterans in their fight for justice:

Rather, the Board denied the claim because the appellant’s hypothesized diagnosis–one he is incompetent to render–proved incorrect, instead of confronting the difficult questions of what current mental condition actually existed and whether it was incurred in or aggravated by service. The Board made no affirmative finding as to the nature of the appellant’s condition, it only observed that the appellant was not diagnosed with PTSD.  However, because the appellant was reasonably requesting benefits for symptoms of a mental condition he was not competent to medically identify, the adjudication of his claim does not end in the face of currently diagnosed mental conditions that are different from his lay hypothesis in his claim form. It is generally the province of medical professionals to diagnose or label a mental condition, not the claimant.  The Board should not limit its consideration of the claim based on the appellant’s  belief that he suffered from PTSD, something he generally is not competent  to render in the first place.  (Clemons v. Shinseki)

This always brings to mind the old saw “Be careful what you ask for”. Ladies and Gentlemen Vets, I give you Mr. William N. Clemons N.M.D. (Not a Medical Doctor):

http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Clemons-5581.pdf

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COVA–Cartwright v. Derwinski(1991)–In the beginning…

      This is a post about the early days of the COVA. The decision is still quoted and cited so I decided to put it in to illustrate where our unique law came from.  

In our dissertation on  Gilbert v. Derwinski (1990), we discussed the ramifications of early law and the Court’s need to create as much precedence vis-a-vis VA law in as short a time as possible to adequately resolve Veterans’ claims in the new court. Following on the heels of that decision was Cartwright. In terms of precedence, it would prove to be earth shattering for Veterans’ claims in years to come. To prove its enduring ramifications, look no further than current decisions to see it cited again and again. Certainly, there have been follow on decisions that reiterated the same principle, but Cartwright continues to be the lighthouse on the hill.

ClydeA. Cartwright, Jr.  first applied for benefits a month after discharge in April of 1946. Unsurprisingly, he was denied. Keep in mind that there was no superior tribunal (court) to the BVA at that time and any denial was the end of the road. Following creation of the COVA in 1988, he returned to reopen his claim. Again he was thwarted with a denial. However, this time, by law, the BVA (and by extension the VARO) was required to explain why he was denied and discuss the evidence pro and con that led them to this decision. This denial illuminated a bad habit the BVA had engaged in for years and years. That is, the habit of discounting any lay testimony by Veterans as having little or no evidentiary value if unsupported by military or medical records, had been the modus operandi for so long, that the BVA was disinclined to change their ways. The VA went so far as to routinely characterize it as a Veteran’s “contentions” as if they were motivated by greed and dishonesty.

The new Court, in an effort to curb this propensity, decided to use Mr. Cartwright’s appeal as a vehicle to right this wrong:

     In its decision, the Board wrote, “[t]he veteran’s contention that he was treated continuously for asthma from 1946 to 1962 is not sufficient to establish that which has not been clinically  documented.” We surmise from this statement that the Board believes that lay evidence alone cannot prove service connection, but that service connection can only be established through medical records. This constitutes error. Nowhere do VA regulations provide that a veteran must establish service connection through medical records alone. Cartwright, supra.

Actually, the Court also said that absent this egregious error, they would still have remanded Mr. Cartwright’s appeal because the BVA had failed to  provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases to support its factual findings. This became a tripwire to the BVA’s continual attempts to give short shrift and even shorter explanations for denying claims. Prior to this, Veterans were left scratching their collective heads, as were their lawyers, every time the BVA announced its findings. Finally, they were being taken to task for their habit of  denying without explaining cogently what the reason for the denial was.

Andy Warhol, the iconic painter of 70s fame, once opined that every person would attain fame for 15 minutes of their life at some point. Mr. Cartwright has exceeded that by several decades of jurisprudence. The reason is simple. The BVA apparently still can’t get it through their thick skulls that in order to deny a Veteran’s claim, they have to give a reasoned, well thought out rationale for their decision based on all the evidence, both positive and negative. Focusing on just the negative, or failing to address the positive frustrates judicial review by higher courts. This is so embedded in law, and VA law in particular, that one would think it it would have become a rare occurrence. One would be fatally mistaken to assume this. Quite the contrary, it is one of the most cited reasons, even in today’s legal arena, for Clear and Unmistakable Error (CUE) claims. The continuing prevalence of this error is disturbing for any number of reasons. Can it be that they do not teach this precept to lawyers in law school? We won’t burden ourselves with that concept today. We are just delighted that Mr. Cartwright appealed his decision and the Court righted what was unarguably a slippery slope for Veterans prior to his entering the legal arena.

Of note, we would like to point out that when a Vet submits a nexus letter in support of his claim, the VA is fond of holding it up to the very same legal standards they are so frequently indicted on. How many times have Veterans read that their nexus wasn’t probative because the doctor had not offered a “reasoned, cogent argument” to explain why the Veteran was entitled to service connection for his injury/disease? It’s always satisfying to read about a Judge getting a DUI. It proves we are all human and should be held to the same legal standard.

Clyde A. Cartwright, Jr., a grateful nation of Veterans thanks you profusely for your perspicacity in the face of what must have appeared to be insurmountable odds…

Cartwright,  at three pages, is one of the shortest opinions ever written . However, it is unarguably well reasoned and well written despite its brevity. A finer, more probative decision has rarely been written in so few words.

Attached below is the PDF.

Cartright_90-28

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CAVC–Harvey v. Shinseki- ORDER (And Be Quick About It)

    

While we here at Asknod rarely involve ourselves in VA Policy, we are starting to observe a sentiment emanating down from the Court to the BVA, and, by extension, its minion, the AOJ.

The Court is a deliberative body and weighs the law in its determination of our claims. Very simply, if the Board has met its legal obligations, the ruling is affirmed. When the Secretary’s position is predicated on defective reasoning and improper legal interpretations, he is overruled and the claim is remanded down for a proper decision based on the Court’s identification of the discrepancy. Occasionally the Court will discover a whole new vein of rights that apply to the Vet that have been overlooked for decades. This is cutting edge precedence. If the Secretary’s position is too far off base, the Court will reverse the offending decision and issue a decision to the contrary in no uncertain terms. This is usually reserved for cases where precedence has existed for a decade or more and the Secretary boldly goes where no VASEC has gone before.

And then there is the power of the Court to order certain things to happen. A remand is a form of a Court order to the BVA to reconsider, remand to the AOJ or write a new decision dictated by the Court. One does not diss the Court. That’s simply bad form. One ignores the dictates of the Court at his own peril. Similarly, reinterpreting the Court’s order to expeditiously accomplish something with a “I’ll get to it when I get to it” attitude will create ill will between one and the Court.

The Court order we are examining here sets no legal precedence. What it does do is extraordinary, though. The Court, in a panel order, has just announced that it is fed up with the continuing shenanigans of our current Secretary and his two immediate predecessors. Finding him in contempt of court for not one, but three egregious errors, they have chosen to sanction him with a monetary fine. That will, of course, simply be deducted from the next claimant’s compensation package. No physical or financial opprobrium will befall the VASEC, but the ignominy of  the action will sting for quite some time. It’s akin to Willie Clinton’s impeachment. No more cigars and blue dresses.  More importantly, its the Court’s way of recognizing a pattern of misbehavior and finally putting their collective foot down.

The Court awarded $11,715.49 to the petitioner, Cleveland D. Harvey in costs and attorney fees. Additionally, they hired some of their Law Dog friends in to observe the proceedings and boo at the proper moment. This  group is called  the Amicus Curiae or the “Friends of the Court” in our stilted Dick and Jane speak. They were awarded $7,879.31 because, hey, they showed up every day and everyone knows Tanqueray martinis and lunch in downtown D.C. are not cheap.

So, everyone got what they wanted except Gen. Revered Leader (USA, retired). Mr. Harvey got closure, but no extra dollars. Mr. Harvey’s attorney got way less than he asked for, but gets to bask in the glory of 15 minutes or more of Warholian fame in the legal world.  The Veteran we cannot introduce you to, as we know not his name, is the one who will end up screwed out of time and money due to his claim being put on hold to clean up this foreseeable mess.

Meet one very upset pissed off Panel of Judges (per curiam):

http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Harvey_10-1284_published_opinion_1-25-2011.pdf

Funny thing was, VA didn’t owe him any more money. They just strung him out and didn’t tell him that. Well, they do now.

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CAVC–Mayhue v. Shinseki (2011) Attempted Horsetrading

 This decision came out several days ago and caught our eye here at the Nod site. The findings aren’t earth shattering, but do illuminate a regulation that is now starting to get more attention.

      Vets may remember that we started talking about how hard it was to reopen an old claim that was not appealed several years ago. We illustrated the traditional arduous route via the CUE path, but also discussed the less traveled road of 38 CFR § 3.156(c). This regulation permitted the Vet to recoup his earlier effective date for service connection with the submission of existing service dept. records which had never been associated with his VA C-File or his military records. If the records were relevant and instrumental in winning his claim, then the date of his original claim became the date of entitlement. This precept has always been in the regs. but was rarely employed. Shortly after this epiphany Vigil v. Peake was decided in 2008. We had no hand in this as the case was already in the CAVC pipeline when we started mentioning it. Nevertheless, it did vindicate our musings on the viability of this defense.

      The VA has sought to narrow the scope of the regulation by emphasizing whether the records were “relevant” to a new decision and if the case could have been decided without their benefit. VA has even gone so far, in some cases, as to question the bona fides of the new evidence, implying it was manufactured to help the claimant prevail. With new regulations concerning PTSD and the added capabilities of the internet, finding old evidence to support one’s claim is becoming markedly easier. This doesn’t bode well for VA’s pocketbooks.

     Considering the history of the Veterans Administration and their supposedly pro veteran stance to grant us that which we are entitled to by law, they certainly spend an inordinate amount of time denying the same. This dichotomy is even more aggravating to those of us who have filed honestly and in good faith only to be denied again and again. Often this is caused by poor record keeping or worse- no record keeping. 

       Mr. Samuel L. Mayhue served honorably in combat in Vietnam during his tenure with the US Army. He filed his claim for PTSD in 1994 and was (gasp) denied. He had failed to report for a exam to confirm his claim. He finally did so later in 1995, but was denied yet again. This denial was based on the fact that VA couldn’t verify his stressors, ergo no dough. Dreambucks. Wishwampum. Mr. Mayhue was very disheartened and did not appeal his adverse decision. We’re almost all guilty of that stupidity if we’re 60-ish.

     In 2000, the combat veteran attempted to reopen his old claim and submitted some new lay testimony. VA denied his request saying he hadn’t submitted new and material evidence that would permit this and that he hadn’t returned his stressor questionnaire. He dutifully did so shortly thereafter and was greeted with yet another denial in late 2002. This time the rationale was that his statements and the info he supplied couldn’t be corroborated. In November of 2003  Mr. Mayhue opted to fight and filed an NOD. I suspect he had had it up to here with this highhandedness. After all, these jokers hold all the cards and researching stressor claims is virtually impossible for the Vet to accomplish.

     Finally in March of 2005 the USACRUR found enough info to support his claim and he was given a 50% rating the following month. Well, think about this. You’ve been screwed for 11 years and then VA finally gives you some bread and a glass of water. No. Make that half of a glass of water. Sam filed another NOD and said back the boat back up to the dock, Gilligan. He wanted his earlier effective date of 1994 (rightfully so) and a TDIU or a 100% schedular rating. VA disagreed and he lost on appeal to the BVA. Which brings us up to 2011. Imagine, gentle reader, investing 16 years into this project off and on only to be handed $609/mo. (or $669/mo. if there was a Mrs. Mayhue) from a grateful nation. Quite the insult in my mind. 

     Enter the Court. The VA was once again taken to task for their arcane habit of  misinterpreting the regulations and misconstruing the legal filings of Mr. Mayhue. The BVA had decided that lay testimony supplied by Mr. Mayhue was not relevant as envisaged by §3.156(c) and therefore his argument  for an earlier effective date  was moot. Further, his request for TDIU was treated as a separate claim rather than a disagreement with his initial rating. That alone is a Bozo no-no in VAland and the BVA should have seen that one coming. Oddly enough, the VA DRO had met with Mr. Mayhue and his lawyer and tried to buy him off  in some heavy-handed horsetrading back in 2006 (after the 50% insult)by handing him a 70% rating and the TDIU. However, VA  just couldn’t bring themselves to parting with all that dough all the way back to 94. One would think it was coming out of their own pockets if he/she didn’t know any better. I have heard ex-VA examiners hold forth on the idea that raters are not so vindictive and that they never even look at what the amount of the claim might entail. Right. They don’t. Their bosses do. How soon we forget the ill-conceived Extraordinary Awards Procedure (EAP) of 2007.

      The sequel to this story is anticlimactic. The Court analyzed the evidence and noted that the VA already had everything they needed in their records to rate Mr. Mayhue for his PTSD claim in 1994. Why they denied him will probably remain a mystery to everyone employed at the VARO. It doesn’t strike us as all that mysterious though. It seems to be a pattern that never deviates except for the individual’s details. Vet files claim. Vet get denied. Vet fails to appeal. Vet comes back at a later date and files again. Vet gets denied again. Vet decides to appeal because he’s smarter(and older) this time out. Vet loses appeal. Vet goes to CAVC. CAVC discovers VA has been blowing smoke up his ass for 15 years and overturns the injustice. VA continues to fight to prevent an expensive settlement going back a number of years. Vet gets grey hair waiting. Vet finally wins just before he dies (sometimes).  

     Without further ado, gather around and listen to the Gospel according to Saints Hagel, Moorman and Lance. It’s very inspiring and the legal reasoning is impeccable, as usual.

http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Mayhue_09-14_published_opinion_1-18-2011.pdf                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     A grateful Nation will now bestow that which  should have given in 1994. I would excuse him if he fails to summons up a heartfelt thank you to the VASEC.
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